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Energy research within the UNFCCC: A proposal 
to guard against ongoing climate-deadlock 
 
Barry W. Brook,1 Kingsley Edney,2 Rafaela Hillerbrand,3 Rasmus Karlsson4 and 
Jonathan Symons5* 
 
Abstract  
We propose that an international ÔLow-Emissions Technology CommitmentÕ should be 
incorporated into the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) negotiation process in order to promote innovation that will enable deep 
decarbonisation. The goal is to accelerate research, development and demonstration of 
safe, scalable and affordable low-emissions energy technologies. Such a commitment 
should be based on three elements. First, it should operate within existing UNFCCC 
negotiations so as to encourage developed states to offer directed funding for energy 
research as part of their national contributions. Second, pledges should be binding, 
verifiable and coordinated within an international energy-research plan. Third, expert 
scientific networks and participating governments should collaborate to design a 
coordinated global research and technology-demonstration strategy and oversee national 
research efforts. To this end an Intergovernmental Panel on Low-Emissions Technology 
Research might be established. This proposal offers some insurance against the risk that 
the political impasse in international negotiations cannot be overcome. The higher costs 
associated with low-emissions alternatives to fossil fuels currently creates significant 
economic and political resistance to their widespread adoption. To breach this impasse, 
a mechanism supporting accelerated energy research is needed that seeks to reduce 
future abatement costs, share experience and Ôlearning-by-doingÕ in first-of-a-kind 
demonstrations, and thus facilitate future widespread deployments. These actions will 
also assist in addressing inequalities in energy access. 
 
Policy Relevance 
Over the past decade, global fossil-fuel use and associated carbon emissions have risen 
steadily, despite the majority of nations agreeing, in principal, to work to limit global 
warming to less than 2¡C above pre-industrial conditions (IPCC, 2014). Accelerated 
research, development and demonstration of low-emissions technologies will be 
required for successful and economically efficient decarbonisation of the global 
economy, but how can the current deadlock be broken? The UNFCCC does not contain 
adequate mechanisms to promote increased investment in research, so climate-
governance institutions are not capturing the gains that could be achieved through a 
globally coordinated approach. Here we outline reform proposals that would enhance 
both the economic effectiveness of global abatement efforts and the political feasibility 
of accelerated innovation. 
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Energy research within the UNFCCC: A proposal 
to guard against ongoing climate-deadlock 
 
 
Over the last two decades, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) negotiation process has made important progress on many fronts, 
but on the most critical benchmarkÑreversal of the trend of increasing annual 
emissions of greenhouse gassesÑit is yet to deliver. If the current negotiation impasse 
is not overcome, and future carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and cement 
continue to increase at >2% annually (the current decadal average), the indicative 
ÔsafeÕ cumulative carbon budget of 527 gigatonnes CO2 for the period 2012Ð2050 will 
be exhausted in just over a decade (Baer et al., 2013). Working from the assumption 
that an improved regime design can create effective incentives to pursue abatement 
efforts, a number of recent proposals have sought to Òbreak the climate impasseÓ (See 
e.g., Grasso & Roberts, 2014; Eckersley, 2012). Reforms that seek to secure 
ambitious abatement commitments and practical action (e.g., deployment of existing 
and demonstration of new low-emissions technologies) are vital and signs of 
cooperation between China and the United States give grounds for hope. However, 
insurance also should be taken against the possibility that ambitious near-term 
mitigation action might prove politically impossible given the current high cost of 
supplying reliable energy from low-emissions sources compared to traditional fossil-
fuel alternatives. For this reason we propose that a ÔLow-Emissions Technology 
CommitmentÕ (LETC) should be incorporated into UNFCCC negotiations as part of 
statesÕ national commitments (see Garnaut, 2008, pp. 219-223). Since accelerated 
energy research and associated technology demonstration would lower the future cost 
of emissions abatement and increase investor confidence, adoption of this proposal 
would improve the prospects that an ambitious agreement will be achieved (Fischer & 
Newell, 2008).  Moreover, negotiation of a LETC would also enhance the economic 
efficiency of, and encourage technology sharing within, any future global mitigation 
agreement. 
Recent experience has shown that achieving an effective global response to 
climate change is inherently challengingÑa classic Ôwicked problemÕ of how 
scientific bases can fail to effect practical social policy (Rittel & Webber, 1973). 
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Moreover, for complex target systems like the climate system, normative assessment 
cannot be disentangled form the scientific enterprise (Douglas, 2000). This further 
complicates climate policy making. Carbon dioxideÕs properties as a stock pollutant 
(Frame et al., 2014), the long life and high capital costs of energy infrastructure, the 
cooperation challenges inherent in providing a global public good in the absence of 
global government, and the distant connection (temporally and geographically) 
between emissions and their most wide-reaching consequences, all create political 
barriers to action.  Moreover, effective international action will require cooperation 
between China and the United States, which are responsible for approximately 29% 
and 17% of global emissions respectively (Olivier et al., 2013). Yet, for so long as the 
political or economic costs of climate action are high, a competitive dynamic akin to a 
ÔprisonerÕs dilemmaÕ may undermine rational cooperation for mutual benefit 
(Rapoport, 1967; Terhalle & Depledge, 2013).  
 These factors suggest that the global politics of emissions reductions will be 
immensely challenging for so long as scalable, low-emissions, dispatchable energy 
sources are more costly and technologically uncertain compared to traditional, 
emissions-intensive power sources. This argument seems to be confirmed by the fact 
that the carbon intensity of global electricity production has remained virtually static 
since the negotiation of the UNFCCC in 1988 (there has been less than a 1% shift 
since 1990: OECD/IEA, 2013). While recent cost reductions mean wind and 
photovoltaic energy may be competitive in the absence of carbon pricing at modest 
levels of grid penetration, intermittent renewables still depend on government support 
for widespread uptake and face particular challenges in dense cities with high 
electricity demand and grid reliability standards (Davis & Socolow, 2014). For this 
reason it is reasonable to anticipate that most rapidly industrialising countries will 
continue using existing coal-fired power plants and constructing new emissions-
intensive energy infrastructure unless the higher costs of low-emissions infrastructure 
is financed internationally (IEA, 2014). While some international support has been 
provided for developing world decarbonisation (e.g. via the Clean Development 
Mechanism), existing mechanisms are susceptible to ÔgamingÕ and lack sufficient 
ambition to forestall ongoing increases in global GHG emissions (Fenton et al., 2014; 
IEA, 2014). While achieving a binding and effective climate mitigation agreement is 
of paramount importance, we argue that it is prudent to also consider the likelihood 
that no sufficiently ambitious agreement will be forthcoming.  
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Innovation and technology policies based on multilateral agreements are, 
when compared to planetary scale interventions such as some climate engineering 
measures, relatively uncontroversial forms of insurance against failure to negotiate an 
ambitious mitigation agreement. Most major analyses of decarbonisation pathways 
have concluded that technology policy must be used to correct market failures that 
result in insufficient basic research, and that this implies increased (and better 
targeted) support for research and development of low-emissions technologies (e.g., 
Goulder et al., 1999, Stern, 2006; Garnaut, 2008, 2011; SDSN & IDDRI, 2014). The 
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (2014) finds that technology policy is 
ÒcomplementaryÓ to the role of Òpolicies aimed directly at reducing current GHG 
emissionsÓ (15.6.1); that development of Ònew technologies is crucial for the ability 
to realistically implement stringent carbon policiesÓ; that support for energy research 
is most effective if it is predictable and increases steadily (15.6.3); and that data 
collection for programme evaluation should be built into technology policy 
programmes (15.6.5). However, public energy-related research and development 
(R&D) expenditures among IEA member-states today account for about 5% of total 
government R&D, compared to 11% observed in 1980 (even in absolute terms 
expenditure has been declining since 2009) (IPCC, 2014,  7.12.4). 
Given the broad consensus that increased energy research would improve the 
prospects for effective mitigation, innovation policy deserves a higher profile in 
climate negotiations. While Article 4(c) of the UNFCCC commits all parties to 
Ò[p]romote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including 
transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent  
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases,Ó the reality is that the UNFCCC 
process, the Technology Mechanism and the associated Technology Executive 
Committee (on which the majority of representatives are from developing states) have 
focused on financing and supporting technology transfer and boosting the innovation 
capacity of developing states, rather than on actions aimed at driving energy 
innovation more generally. For example, as at September 2014, the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network had secured only USD 26.6 million from bilateral 
sources, which is a tiny fraction of the funding required for meaningful research and 
development (UNFCCC, 2014, p.15). Our proposal seeks to rectify this inattention. 
Specifically, research funding commitments should be incorporated explicitly into 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions to be incorporated into a new 
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international climate agreement to be finalised at the 2015 Paris conference of the 
parties to the UNFCCC. In 2015 national commitments might detail total state 
investment, private-sector funding mobilisation targets, priority research areas, and 
broader mechanisms of state support. In the longer term states might work toward the 
more challenging goal of harmonising these research commitments into an 
international research plan designed in collaboration with expert bodies, such as 
National Academies of Engineering. 
The phrase ÔLow-Emissions Technology CommitmentÕ is drawn from two 
economic reports prepared for the Australian government by economist Ross Garnaut 
(2008, pp. 219-223; 2011, p.118). Garnaut argues that an economically efficient 
global climate response would involve both internationally linked emissions trading 
and a coordinated increase in research funding (Garnaut suggested commitments of 
about $100 billion per annum, globally). Whereas Garnaut advocated accelerated 
research across all relevant sectors, we judge that a LETC should initially avoid 
unnecessary complication by focusing on energy, the sector that is responsible for the 
largest share of emissions.  A LETC would seek to both lift aggregate investment and 
to coordinate national research efforts.  While Garnaut broke new ground in arguing 
that affluent states should partially discharge their climate leadership obligations by 
setting goals for increased research support within a formal international commitment, 
his focus on innovation and technology policy as prerequisites of decarbonisation 
confirmed much earlier work. Formal game-theoretical analysis (Urpelainen, 2012) 
suggests that states are more likely to commit to an international energy research and 
development treaty than to ambitious climate action that seeks to cut emissions across 
the economy, both because the near-term national benefits of energy research are 
much greater (in contrast, most benefits of mitigation accrue only in the distant future 
and thus may be more uncertain) and because if states make reciprocal commitments 
to simultaneously increase energy research and development then they will benefit 
from the positive externalities arising from the global effort. A well-designed research 
treaty would also increase the efficiency of the aggregate research effort by 
facilitating international coordination and specialisation (Victor, 2011, pp. 154-162). 
Although the value of an international energy research treaty is commonly 
recognised, its incorporation into the UNFCCC negotiation process is not often 
discussed (see de Coninck, 2008). 
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Element One: Integrating energy research commitments into UNFCCC 
negotiation process 
 
Integrating Ôresearch, development and demonstrationÕ (RD&D) commitments into 
the UNFCCC negotiation process is our key innovation in this proposal (See, Stepp & 
Nicholson, 2014). Admittedly, this would surrender one of the widely noted 
advantages of a stand-alone research treaty: that it could be successfully negotiated 
among only a small number of parties and thus avoid the UNFCCCÕs political 
gridlock (Victor, 2011). Since national investment in innovation is heavily 
concentrated in only a few states (e.g. United States, Japan, Germany, France, Korea, 
United Kingdom and China) a research treaty involving only a small number of high 
capacity states could be effective. Moreover, some leading advocates of an energy 
research treaty (similar to a LETC), such as David Victor, have argued that design 
flaws in the UNFCCC are so serious that an entirely new architecture of climate 
governance is required (Prins et al., 2010, Victor, 2011). In this view an energy 
research treaty is more likely to be successful if its design is controlled by those states 
that are capable of making a major contribution.  
Despite the strong conceptual case for a stand-alone energy research treaty, 
the incorporation of LETC into the UNFCCC process would be beneficial because it 
would 1) harness the UNFCCCÕs legitimacy and political momentum to support 
speedy negotiation of a research agreement; 2) assist with breaking the international 
deadlock in climate negotiations; and 3) nurture domestic political engagement with 
innovation policy as a form of climate action. Most significant are the questions of 
legitimacy. While the theoretical case for a stand-alone research treaty is compelling, 
the idea has not been strongly advocated by any influential state or civil society 
group.  If it is to become a near-term reality a LETC needs to be placed on the agenda 
of an established forum, like the G20 or the UNFCCC. In our judgement the 
UNFCCCÕs relative legitimacy makes it the best existing institutional candidate (see 
Symons, 2011; Slaughter, 2013). While it is already very late in the day for energy 
research to be incorporated into the Paris agreement, the political difficulties that 
confound UNFCCC negotiations create openings for eleventh hour compromise 
proposals; for example, the Copenhagen COP outcome was transformed by the 
unorthodox introduction of a ÒCopenhagen AccordÓ that had little connection to the 
previous negotiations and yet still allowed for some commitments and actions to 
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proceed (Christoff, 2010). It is possible that strong advocacy by an influential state or 
group (most likely the informal UNFCCC negotiating group known as the Umbrella 
Group, which includes Japan, Australia and Canada) would be sufficient to rapidly 
incorporate research pledges as an additional component of the UNFCCC agenda. In 
short, although UNFCCC negotiations might compromise treaty design, a LETC is 
most likely to eventuate if it is incorporated as part of a broader climate treaty, rather 
than being petitioned de novo.  
A second set of advantages arise because research pledges could complement 
wider UNFCCC negotiations by prompting an increase in aggregate commitments 
and ameliorating north-south tensions. Domestic polarisation over climate politics 
causes some statesÕ willingness to contribute to mitigation and international financing 
to fluctuate. The involvement of climate laggards, which currently include Japan, 
Canada and Australia, risks undermining the international cooperative mitigation 
effort since other states are reluctant to be exploited by those they perceive as free 
riders. However, if those states that refuse to accept ambitious emission-abatement 
targets have the option of compensating with increased research pledges, this might 
lessen their negative impact. The option of making a contribution to the global 
mitigation effort via a RD&D-driven domestic response might also increase the 
political appeal of the UNFCCC process among groups (some states and domestic 
constituencies) that oppose emissions pledges or carbon pricing for ideological 
reasons. It is no coincidence that the George W. Bush Administration prioritised 
energy research or that Japan, under Shinzo Abe, announced increased funding for 
energy research at the same time as it walked away from its ambitious Copenhagen 
pledge at the Warsaw COP in 2013.  
Of course there is a danger that if research pledges are perceived to be a 
substitute for action, rather than additional to abatement pledges, this will undermine 
the legitimacy of a LETC. Nevertheless, research commitments complement the 
existing agenda supporting financing of technology transfer provided they are 
additional to transfer funding; for this reason research commitments might potentially 
ameliorate the north-south tensions that currently contribute to negotiation gridlock. 
By providing opportunities for leadership not only to developed countries but also to 
ambitious developing states that are interested in expanding their research and 
innovation capacity, a LETC could create an opening for Ôinclusive minilateralismÕ 
(Eckersley, 2012).  Moreover, a LETC might potentially minimise the negative 
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impact of great power rivalry by prompting China and the US to cooperate in order to 
share in the benefits of energy innovation, building on the momentum achieved at the 
recent APEC meeting in Beijing. Where mitigation pledges are often perceived as 
imposing an economic cost that reduces relative power, pledges to accelerate 
innovation can be anticipated to prompt technological competition that may have the 
positive externality of reduced greenhouse-gas emissions. Certainly, ChinaÕs current 
investments in a tranche of new commercial nuclear plants, and funding for RD&D 
into next-generation systems such as thorium and modular pebble-fueled reactors, 
appear intended to address energy security as well as climate and air quality concerns. 
For a great power such as the United States or China, being less constrained by 
emissions reduction targets than a peer competitor and achieving breakthroughs in 
energy innovation should both increase relative material power, but only the latter 
produces positive environmental externalities. 
While China (like the United States) has thus far failed to sign on to legally 
binding emissions reduction agreements, it does set national targets as a part of its 
five-year plans and now hopes for emissions to plateau after 2030. ChinaÕs leadership 
role in the G77 also makes it highly sensitive to issues of north-south justice, which 
indicate that the cooperative surplus arising from any agreement should be distributed 
in a way that benefits rather than stymies the socio-economic goals of developing 
states (Stone, 2004). Of course, addressing international energy inequality is a very 
important part of the decarbonisation challenge (Bazilian & Pielke, 2013; Tawney, 
Miller & Bazilian, 2013)Ñglobally approximately 1 billion people lack any access to 
electricity, and about one third of the global population is dependent on biomass for 
cooking, resulting in indoor air pollution with particularly serious chronic-health 
implications for women (Gordon et al., 2014). However, least-cost efforts to address 
energy inequality, by following a traditional fossil-fuel development pathway, will 
increase global CO2 emissions and demands to address historical injustices in global 
climate negotiations have the potential to reduce the total ambition if differing 
perceptions of justice are used to justify inaction (Heyward, 2007). These tensions 
between statesÕ self-interest and justice will only be eliminated when low-emission 
energy sources enjoy a considerable cost advantage. It follows that one goal of 
research should be reducing energy costs on a global basis (Karlsson & Symons, 
2015). 
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A third advantage of incorporating an energy research commitment into the 
UNFCCC process is that it might broaden the domestic political constituencies that 
support energy research and build stronger links between energy researchers, 
engineers and environmental activists. The argument for aggressive energy research 
has not generally been embraced by environmental organisations or social movements 
(Till & Chang, 2011) in part because the mass environmental movement has often 
been distrustful of technical solutions (often pejoratively called Ôtechno-fixesÕ), and in 
part because of a suspicion that Ôenergy researchÕ will become an excuse for inaction. 
Such suspicions were not allayed by the Bush-era ÒAsia Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Energy and DevelopmentÓ (APP), which was touted as a research-based alternative to 
the Kyoto Protocol, but which was wound up in 2011 because it had produced no 
significant achievements. The APPÕs poor design and implementation suggests that it 
was in part a political diversion. Those domestic constituencies that are most 
committed to climate action are rightly suspicious that the strong intellectual case for 
energy research will again be marshalled as an excuse for inaction. If an energy 
research commitment forms part of a universal climate agreement, however, then it is 
likely that civil society groups will be better positioned to monitor and critique 
domestic implementation of RD&D commitments. 
Given that there is no significant political constituency supporting negotiation 
of a LETC, it is unlikely that our proposal will be adopted. While we argue that the 
UNFCCC is the most promising forum for a successful LETC, we recognise that 
many of the advantages of increased attention to energy research could be achieved 
through agreements negotiated by the G20, under a stand-alone treaty or through bi-
lateral agreements. 
 
Element Two: binding and verifiable commitments.  
 
The advantages of formulating research commitments as treaty obligations are widely 
noted. One of the key reasons why states acting alone can be anticipated to under-
invest in research is that many of the benefits of innovation policy are positive 
externalities that cannot be captured locally. Yet if multiple states enter into binding 
and verifiable commitments, including technology sharing, then this boosts the 
anticipated benefits that will be derived by each and also enlarges the anticipated 
market for advanced technologies (Victor, 2011). Formulating commitments as 
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international treaty obligations also has the advantage of binding successor 
governments and thus increasing efficiency by stabilising research funding through 
time (Hawkins et al., 2006:124).  Nevertheless, it is likely the states might put 
forward a combination of binding commitments and non-binding pledges. A 
combination of bottom-up pledges linked to national priorities, and revision in the 
light of global goals may be best suited to maximise commitment and coordination 
and would follow the broader Intended Nationally Determined Contribution process. 
It should be emphasised that the early stages of a LETC should not require 
shifting decision-making to a supranational level, as this would tend to reduce 
national support. However, if information sharing about national research efforts 
increases this is likely to prompt productive coordination. The experience (good and 
bad) of a variety of coordinated international research projects, including CERN 
(fundamental research in particle physics), ITER (applied research in nuclear fusion) 
and ITERÕs predecessor project JET, and processes for achieving a political 
consensus on scientific standards, including the IPCC and the WTOÕs Committee on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (CSPM), will be instructive in this coordination 
process (Victor, 2011, p. 155). Since energy research is inherently uncertain and 
many projects will inevitably fail, delegating some responsibility for project selection 
to expert assessment could also provide some protection for risk-averse national 
policy-makers against being unfairly held to account for projects that are not 
ultimately commercialised. 
Controversy might arise around some energy options, such as nuclear fission 
(or carbon capture and storage/utilisation). While some states are already engaged in 
accelerated research and investment in next-generation nuclear technologies, much of 
the global environmental movement may be opposed. This controversy is unlikely to 
be a major problem as most states will be content for others already involved in 
nuclear-related RD&D to pursue this effort. However, a LETC would likely be 
critiqued by some civil society groups if it appeared to endorse nuclear energy or CCS 
as a preferred climate response. While incorporation of nuclear innovation appears 
essential to maximise any research treatyÕs contribution to future mitigation (Brook, 
2012), it may undermine its legitimacy within civil society. This is an example of the 
type of conundrum that such an energy RD&D agreement would need to broker. 
 
Element Three: An Intergovernmental Panel on Energy Research 
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One way to cut through political impasses and to promote deeper coordination of 
international research will be to marshal fully the supporting science and engineering 
experience that could support rational decision making on energy RD&D investments 
Ð much like the mandate of the IPCC on climate science and impacts. Coordinating 
research efforts in this way (like harmonising international approaches to intellectual 
property rights and commercialisation) involves broader and more complex 
challenges than simply quantifying national contributions. Here, we offer only some 
preliminary comments on how a LETC might be structured so as to promote its 
central goal of Ôdirected technological changeÕ toward safe, scalable, affordable low-
emissions energy systems.  
Given the varied political agendas involved, the complexity of research needs, 
the potential for pure Ôblue skyÕ research to make unpredictable contributions and the 
need to coordinate innovation with incentives for demonstration and pathways to 
wider deployment (including international regulation of intellectual property and 
barriers to trade) design of a LETC will be complex. An Intergovernmental Panel on 
Energy Research, composed of scientific experts nominated by participating states, 
might usefully inform treaty negotiations but work independently of them. This Panel 
would probably need to be an independent organisation that operates separately from 
the IPCC.  While this PanelÕs mandate would need to go far beyond reviews and 
forecasting, it might partially displace the current role of the IPCCÕs Working Group 
III (which reviews progress in, and projections for, energy pathways). It will be 
difficult for this body to avoid the kinds of problems (including politicisation) that 
have plagued the IPCC, but what is needed is a technically expert body that is capable 
of facilitating international agreement on issues including the strategic selection and 
coordination of energy-technology projects and of mechanisms to support 
technologies through the Ôvalley of deathÕ to demonstration (Victor, 2011).  
The design of such an intergovernmental panel and its relationship to IPCC 
WGIII cannot be prescribed theoretically, but would need to be negotiated by states. 
Since national commitments are likely to be greatest if there is considerable autonomy 
to pursue national priorities, the purpose of expert assessment should be to promote 
international transparency and coordination, including partnership investment in new 
infrastructural facilities (again, ITER and CERN are relevant examples, as are the 
Human Genome Project and the Galileo navigation satellite system (Lindstrm & 
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Gasparini, 2003)). An overly prescriptive approach risks discouraging contributions 
and inviting politicisation. Nevertheless, expert assessment would be valuable to 
outline research priorities appropriate for global decarbonisation, to set research 
timelines that support UNFCCC decarbonisation goals, to assess whether national 
research proposals are sufficiently aligned with LETC objectives to be counted 
toward a stateÕs funding commitments, to assisting to verify national compliance with 
agreed research targets, to review performance, boost the legitimacy of the energy 
research commitment and minimise rent-seeking which might see research funding 
captured as subsidies for particular industries (Helm, 2010). Moreover, involvement 
of international scientific bodies and scientific communities would create an extra 
process of deliberation on global objectives.  Nevertheless, ultimate control should 
remain at a national (or regional) level in order to preserve state commitment to the 
research agenda. The international diversity of innovation systems, and differing roles 
of state and private-sectors actors and networks in each, should  also mean that there 
is no single model under which RD&D should be financed and promoted (see 
Mazzucato, 2013). 
It is essential for reasons of both justice and effectiveness that the innovation 
challenges associated with energy access in the developing world should be 
considered alongside the challenges of decarbonisation of developed economies. 
However, since the purpose of a LETC is to address global energy needs it must move 
beyond the mandate of the the Climate Technology Centre and Network, and the 
Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer.  Expert assessment might 
provide a forum for developing country perspectives to influence research design and 
geographical locations for demonstration facilities (e.g. the prime large-scale solar 
thermal sites are typically situated in developing countries, as envisaged within the 
African-to-Europe ÔTRECÕ power-network concept), even if these nations do not 
make significant research commitments themselves.  While it is inevitable that 
developing states will seek to ensure that treaty funding also supports a technology 
transfer programme, separating the two issues (so that a LETC considers global needs 
including developed world decarbonisation challenges, while the Technology 
Mechanism focuses on technology transfer and developing world innovation capacity) 
is likely to maximise research contributions, and thus maximise positive externalities. 
There is also a plausible argument that expert assessment should take on a broader 
role and address the challenges of integrating research with measures to promote 
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diffusion and deployment of proven but yet-to-be-scaled energy technologies. 
Internationally, these might include harmonisation of intellectual property rules and 
elimination of barriers to trade. However, the political complexities of these issues 
mean that they should probably be addressed sequentially. While many institutional 
reforms would be desirable, a LETC is most likely to be implemented if it is not 
unnecessarily linked with complex and politically challenging issues. 
 
A prerequisite for stabilisation 
 
It is now too late to hope that harmful consequences of anthropogenic climate change 
can be avoided altogether even in the unlikely event that all the Ôpledge and reviewÕ 
commitments from Copenhagen and Cancun are implemented fully. In climate policy 
there are no silver bullets; the challenges that have created gridlock in climate 
negotiations over the last 20 years, especially with respect to emissions reduction 
targets, will only be overcome with great difficulty if at all. Our proposalÑalthough 
an important policy advanceÑwill also not produce rapid results, but we argue that if 
adopted it would increase the efficiency and possible ambition of future climate 
agreements. Many people who understand the scale of the threat posed by climate 
change will likely view incorporating energy research into UNFCCC commitments as 
a distraction from the urgent task of commencing decarbonisation using already 
available technologies. We agree that decarbonisation should be the highest priority 
of global climate policy. However, the international communityÕs ongoing failure to 
stabilise, let alone reduce, greenhouse gas emissions, suggests the need for new 
approaches. Since energy research, development and associated technology 
demonstration promise to reduce both the economic and political barriers to deep 
decarbonisation, a LETC could improve the chances of an ambitious international 
agreement being reached in 2015. At the same time it provides insurance against 
failure of direct emissions-reduction agreements by improving the political prospects 
for ambitious and lower-cost abatement in later years. 
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